DOCUMENTATIONv2

POST

Identity sessions and federation

Cancel account closure request

/api/v2/account-closure-requests/{request_uuid}/cancellations

AUTHENTICATIONBearer token · profile:writeAUTHORITATIVE OWNERidentity-serviceCONTRACT AUTHORITYGenerated Rust OpenAPISTATUSSource ready · production listed

PURPOSE + BUSINESS CONTEXT

Cancel an eligible closure request after fresh authenticator verification when required.

WHEN THIS CALL IS USEFUL

Call this when an account holder, authentication client, security administrator, or identity-lifecycle agent needs to apply the documented account closure request transition after re-reading the current authoritative state so it can create and govern account access through explicit registration, activation, session, authenticator, recovery, and closure stages.

OUTCOME · Create or advance

What changes

Creates or advances only the account closure request resource described by this contract after authorization, validation, policy, and idempotency gates pass.

WHY IT MATTERS

Gives people and agents a contract-backed way to advance account closure request.
Makes credential and account-lifecycle transitions explicit while keeping passwords, authenticator secrets, recovery codes, refresh tokens, devices, sessions, and account state under separate controls.

ISOLATION + AUTHORITY

Tenant identity, profile, password, authenticator enrollment, recovery code, device, session, access token, refresh credential, step-up grant, and account-closure state remain distinct. Authentication proves only the admitted session and scopes; it grants no workspace role, wallet, payment, settlement, publisher, matching, or trading authority.

BEFORE YOU CALL

Authenticate at the documented boundary: bearer+scope.
Supply the required request_uuid (path) exactly as defined by the live contract.
Use one Idempotency-Key only for retries of the same byte-equivalent logical mutation.
Resolve the tenant, account lifecycle, client device, credential state, authenticator or recovery basis, and required step-up purpose for this security transition.

WHAT TO DO NEXT

Re-read account lifecycle and active-session state to confirm the closure request and any resulting access restrictions.
Use the separately governed retention, export, recovery, or support process for obligations that survive account access closure.

AGENT GUIDANCE

Use account closure request only for the purpose and lifecycle stage described by this operation; do not treat it as authority for an adjacent action.
Supply the required request_uuid (path) exactly as defined by the live contract.
Keep registration, activation, credential verification, session issuance, refresh rotation, authenticator enrollment, confirmation, recovery, revocation, and account closure as separate lifecycle transitions.
After a timeout or conflict, read authoritative state before deciding whether an equivalent retry is safe.

MACHINE CONTRACT

The exact deployed parameters, schemas, responses, security requirements, and Hybrid-Chain agent metadata are authoritative at this operation's production OpenAPI JSON Pointer. The readable tables below add integration guidance; the deployed OpenAPI controls if guidance and the machine contract ever differ.

Open the authoritative production contract ↗

EXTENDED INTEGRATION GUIDANCE

Readable request and response reference

Examples illustrate integration intent; the referenced OpenAPI operation and component schemas define the executable shape.

PARAMETERS

Headers, path, query, and body

NAMELOCATIONPRESENCETYPE / RULES / PURPOSE

AuthorizationheaderRequired

Bearer tokenCredential containing the profile:write scope.EXAMPLEBearer hc_live_…

Idempotency-KeyheaderRequired

ASCII string · 1–128Caller-generated key reused for every retry of the same logical mutation.EXAMPLElaunch-treasury-v1-001

Content-TypeheaderRequired

application/jsonSigned mutations accept canonical JSON only.EXAMPLEapplication/json

Content-DigestheaderRequired

RFC 9530 SHA-256 digestDigest of the exact transmitted body bytes.EXAMPLEsha-256=:47DEQpj8HBSa+/TImW+5JCeuQeRkm5NMpJWZG3hSuFU=:

Signature-InputheaderRequired

RFC 9421 signature parametersCovers @method, @path, content-digest, content-type, and idempotency-key; includes keyid, nonce, created, and expires.EXAMPLEsig1=("@method" "@path" "content-digest" "content-type" "idempotency-key");created=1786582800;expires=1786583100;nonce="01J…";keyid="machine-prod"

SignatureheaderRequired

Ed25519 HTTP Message SignatureSignature made by an active public key registered to the authenticated client.EXAMPLEsig1=:base64-signature:

request_uuidpathRequired

32-character identifierAccount-closure request owned by the authenticated identity.EXAMPLE6f8d6b1165bb47ca9746897e38c31bd2

X-Request-IDheaderOptional

correlation identifier · max 128Optional caller correlation identifier.

step_up_tokenbodyOptional

hcsu_ tokenFresh ACCOUNT_CLOSURE_REQUEST authorization. Required when TOTP is enabled.

REQUEST

JSON body example

{
  "step_up_token": "hcsu_…"
}

STABLE ERROR CODES

Branch on the code, then follow the recovery action

These codes are published by the authoritative gateway contract for this endpoint. Treat message as safe diagnostic text; integrations should branch on code and HTTP status.

STATUSCODEMEANING

400invalid_jsonThe JSON body is malformed or fails the published account schema.

400invalid_security_requestThe account lifecycle request is invalid.

400missing_idempotency_keyA nonempty Idempotency-Key is required for this mutation.

401invalid_credentialsThe bearer, password, activation, or reset credential is invalid.

403step_up_requiredFresh purpose-bound authenticator verification is required.

404account_closure_not_foundThe account closure request was not found.

409security_conflictThe requested account transition conflicts with current security state.

409account_closure_conflictThe account closure transition conflicts with current lifecycle state.

503identity_security_unavailableThe authoritative Identity security service is temporarily unavailable.

RESPONSES

Status and payload examples

200Closure request cancelled; repeated cancellation returns the same terminal state.Mutation completed · JSON RESPONSE+

{
  "request_uuid": "6f8d6b1165bb47ca9746897e38c31bd2",
  "profile_uuid": "f8317aef81764e1f923037c1b76df8de",
  "tenant_uuid": "global",
  "status": "CANCELLED",
  "reason_code": "PRIVACY",
  "version": 2,
  "requested_at": "2026-08-13T19:20:00Z",
  "scheduled_for": "2026-09-12T19:20:00Z",
  "cancelled_at": "2026-08-14T08:10:00Z",
  "completed_at": null,
  "processing_attempts": 0,
  "blocked_until": null,
  "blocker_code": null,
  "last_error_code": null,
  "idempotent_replay": false
}

INTEGRATION DECISION

CALLER ACTION: Accept the returned representation or receipt, then re-read account lifecycle and active-session state to confirm the closure request and any resulting access restrictions.
RETRY SAFETY: Do not repeat a successful mutation merely to confirm it. For one logical mutation, retain the same Idempotency-Key and byte-equivalent request. Never reuse that key for changed instructions.
STATE RECONCILIATION: Persist returned identifiers, versions, commitments, and receipts. Refresh the subject, claim or credential version, issuer and reviewer authority, evidence commitment, decision, expiry, and revocation status.

400The JSON body, identifier, or required signed headers are invalid.Request must change · JSON RESPONSE+

{
  "code": "invalid_security_request",
  "message": "The JSON body, identifier, or required signed headers are invalid."
}

INTEGRATION DECISIONinvalid_security_request

CALLER ACTION: Rebuild the request from the live OpenAPI operation and correct the rejected method, media type, header, parameter, or body field.
RETRY SAFETY: Do not retry the same invalid request. For one logical mutation, retain the same Idempotency-Key and byte-equivalent request. Never reuse that key for changed instructions.
STATE RECONCILIATION: Compare the submitted values with the documented constraints before another call. Refresh the subject, claim or credential version, issuer and reviewer authority, evidence commitment, decision, expiry, and revocation status.
ESCALATE WHEN: Escalate when subject binding, evidence minimization, issuer or reviewer authority, decision lineage, expiry, or revocation cannot be established.

401The bearer credential or HTTP Message Signature is missing, expired, replayed, or invalid.Authentication required · JSON RESPONSE+

{
  "code": "invalid_credentials",
  "message": "The bearer credential or HTTP Message Signature is missing, expired, replayed, or invalid."
}

INTEGRATION DECISIONinvalid_credentials

CALLER ACTION: Discard the rejected credential, complete the documented authentication or reassertion flow, and rebuild any request signature with fresh timestamps and nonces.
RETRY SAFETY: Retry only with a newly valid credential and fresh replay-protection values. For one logical mutation, retain the same Idempotency-Key and byte-equivalent request. Never reuse that key for changed instructions.
STATE RECONCILIATION: Assume the outcome is unknown only when the connection failed after transmission; otherwise authentication failed before domain work. Refresh the subject, claim or credential version, issuer and reviewer authority, evidence commitment, decision, expiry, and revocation status.
ESCALATE WHEN: Escalate when subject binding, evidence minimization, issuer or reviewer authority, decision lineage, expiry, or revocation cannot be established.

403The session lacks profile authority, current-password proof failed, or fresh authenticator verification is required.Authority or policy denied · JSON RESPONSE+

{
  "code": "step_up_required",
  "message": "The session lacks profile authority, current-password proof failed, or fresh authenticator verification is required."
}

INTEGRATION DECISIONstep_up_required

CALLER ACTION: Verify the exact scope, tenant or workspace membership, owner boundary, step-up purpose, feature policy, and resource eligibility. Never broaden authority automatically.
RETRY SAFETY: Do not retry until the missing authority or policy condition has been deliberately resolved with least privilege.
STATE RECONCILIATION: Confirm the caller and resource resolve to the same authority boundary for subject-scoped trust claims, evidence, credentials, reviews, decisions, presentations, and revocations.
ESCALATE WHEN: Escalate when subject binding, evidence minimization, issuer or reviewer authority, decision lineage, expiry, or revocation cannot be established.

404The request does not exist for the authenticated identity or is no longer cancellable.Resource not visible · JSON RESPONSE+

{
  "code": "account_closure_not_found",
  "message": "The request does not exist for the authenticated identity or is no longer cancellable."
}

INTEGRATION DECISIONaccount_closure_not_found

CALLER ACTION: Verify the canonical identifier and authenticated owner boundary. A 404 may intentionally conceal a resource outside the caller's authority.
RETRY SAFETY: Do not retry the unchanged identifier repeatedly. Refresh the relevant collection or lookup before choosing another identifier.
STATE RECONCILIATION: Refresh the subject, claim or credential version, issuer and reviewer authority, evidence commitment, decision, expiry, and revocation status.
ESCALATE WHEN: Escalate when subject binding, evidence minimization, issuer or reviewer authority, decision lineage, expiry, or revocation cannot be established.

503The authoritative Identity lifecycle is unavailable.Dependency unavailable or outcome uncertain · JSON RESPONSE+

{
  "code": "identity_security_unavailable",
  "message": "The authoritative Identity lifecycle is unavailable."
}

INTEGRATION DECISIONidentity_security_unavailable

CALLER ACTION: Preserve the exact request and treat the outcome as uncertain until authoritative state proves whether it committed.
RETRY SAFETY: Reconcile before retrying. For one logical mutation, retain the same Idempotency-Key and byte-equivalent request. Never reuse that key for changed instructions. Use bounded backoff with jitter.
STATE RECONCILIATION: Refresh the subject, claim or credential version, issuer and reviewer authority, evidence commitment, decision, expiry, and revocation status.
ESCALATE WHEN: Escalate when subject binding, evidence minimization, issuer or reviewer authority, decision lineage, expiry, or revocation cannot be established.

OPERATIONAL NOTES

Security and lifecycle guarantees

Cancellation is permitted during cooling-off and blocked processing states, before V2 access revocation reaches READY_FOR_ERASURE.
The cancellation mutation is HTTP-message-signed and retry-safe.

DOCUMENTATION STATUS

This route is implemented in canonical gateway source and appears in the production OpenAPI snapshot observed 2026-09-11T06:35:11.572Z. Authentication, tenant, feature, venue, and market policy still apply.

Verify the exact production OpenAPI operation ↗Return to the V2 directory ↗