DOCUMENTATIONv2

POST

Authentication

Confirm authenticator enrollment

/api/v2/me/authenticator-enrollments/{enrollment_id}/confirmations

AUTHENTICATIONBearer token · security:writeAUTHORITATIVE OWNERidentity-access · identity-serviceCONTRACT AUTHORITYGenerated Rust OpenAPISTATUSSource ready · production listed

PURPOSE + BUSINESS CONTEXT

Verify a live authenticator code, activate TOTP, and return single-view recovery codes.

WHEN THIS CALL IS USEFUL

Confirm immediately after enrollment with a current six-digit TOTP generated from the returned secret in the same account session.

OUTCOME · Create or advance

What changes

Consumes the pending enrollment, enables TOTP, and returns ten single-use recovery codes once.

WHY IT MATTERS

Gives people and agents a contract-backed way to advance authenticator enrollment.
Makes credential and account-lifecycle transitions explicit while keeping passwords, authenticator secrets, recovery codes, refresh tokens, devices, sessions, and account state under separate controls.

ISOLATION + AUTHORITY

Tenant identity, profile, password, authenticator enrollment, recovery code, device, session, access token, refresh credential, step-up grant, and account-closure state remain distinct. Authentication proves only the admitted session and scopes; it grants no workspace role, wallet, payment, settlement, publisher, matching, or trading authority.

BEFORE YOU CALL

Authenticate at the documented boundary: bearer+scope.
Supply the required enrollment_id (path), code (body) exactly as defined by the live contract.
Use one Idempotency-Key only for retries of the same byte-equivalent logical mutation.
Resolve the tenant, account lifecycle, client device, credential state, authenticator or recovery basis, and required step-up purpose for this security transition.

WHAT TO DO NEXT

Present the single-view recovery codes once and require the account holder to store them securely outside the active session.
Re-read account security state and require a new session or step-up where policy changes invalidate earlier authorization.

AGENT GUIDANCE

Use authenticator enrollment only for the purpose and lifecycle stage described by this operation; do not treat it as authority for an adjacent action.
Supply the required enrollment_id (path), code (body) exactly as defined by the live contract.
Keep registration, activation, credential verification, session issuance, refresh rotation, authenticator enrollment, confirmation, recovery, revocation, and account closure as separate lifecycle transitions.
After a timeout or conflict, read authoritative state before deciding whether an equivalent retry is safe.

MACHINE CONTRACT

The exact deployed parameters, schemas, responses, security requirements, and Hybrid-Chain agent metadata are authoritative at this operation's production OpenAPI JSON Pointer. The readable tables below add integration guidance; the deployed OpenAPI controls if guidance and the machine contract ever differ.

Open the authoritative production contract ↗

EXTENDED INTEGRATION GUIDANCE

Readable request and response reference

Examples illustrate integration intent; the referenced OpenAPI operation and component schemas define the executable shape.

PARAMETERS

Headers, path, query, and body

NAMELOCATIONPRESENCETYPE / RULES / PURPOSE

AuthorizationheaderRequired

Bearer tokenCredential containing the security:write scope.EXAMPLEBearer hc_live_…

Idempotency-KeyheaderRequired

ASCII string · 1–128Caller-generated key reused for every retry of the same logical mutation.EXAMPLElaunch-treasury-v1-001

Content-TypeheaderRequired

application/jsonSigned mutations accept canonical JSON only.EXAMPLEapplication/json

Content-DigestheaderRequired

RFC 9530 SHA-256 digestDigest of the exact transmitted body bytes.EXAMPLEsha-256=:47DEQpj8HBSa+/TImW+5JCeuQeRkm5NMpJWZG3hSuFU=:

Signature-InputheaderRequired

RFC 9421 signature parametersCovers @method, @path, content-digest, content-type, and idempotency-key; includes keyid, nonce, created, and expires.EXAMPLEsig1=("@method" "@path" "content-digest" "content-type" "idempotency-key");created=1786582800;expires=1786583100;nonce="01J…";keyid="machine-prod"

SignatureheaderRequired

Ed25519 HTTP Message SignatureSignature made by an active public key registered to the authenticated client.EXAMPLEsig1=:base64-signature:

enrollment_idpathRequired

32-character identifierPending enrollment returned by the begin call and bound to this session.

codebodyRequired

6-digit TOTPCurrent code generated from the pending enrollment secret.

REQUEST

JSON body example

{
  "code": "123456"
}

STABLE ERROR CODES

Branch on the code, then follow the recovery action

These codes are published by the authoritative gateway contract for this endpoint. Treat message as safe diagnostic text; integrations should branch on code and HTTP status.

STATUSCODEMEANING

400invalid_jsonThe JSON body is malformed or fails the published identity-security schema.

400invalid_security_requestThe session, scope, public key, proof, or purpose-bound security request is invalid.

401invalid_credentialsThe bearer, client assertion, or proof-of-possession credential is invalid.

403step_up_requiredFresh purpose-bound authenticator verification or stronger authority is required.

404signing_key_not_foundThe requested signing-key or workload-client resource was not found.

409security_conflictThe requested identity-security transition conflicts with current state.

503identity_security_unavailableThe authoritative Identity security service is temporarily unavailable.

RESPONSES

Status and payload examples

200Authenticator enabled; recovery codes returned once.Mutation completed · JSON RESPONSE+

{
  "status": "ENABLED",
  "recovery_codes": [
    "A1B2C3D4E5-F6A7B8C9D0",
    "… nine more …"
  ],
  "warning": "Store these recovery codes now; they will not be shown again."
}

INTEGRATION DECISION

CALLER ACTION: Accept the returned representation or receipt, then present the single-view recovery codes once and require the account holder to store them securely outside the active session.
RETRY SAFETY: Do not repeat a successful mutation merely to confirm it. For one logical mutation, retain the same Idempotency-Key and byte-equivalent request. Never reuse that key for changed instructions.
STATE RECONCILIATION: Persist returned identifiers, versions, commitments, and receipts. Refresh the relevant account, session, authenticator, client, key, or one-time transaction state; replace consumed or expired credentials instead of replaying them.

400The enrollment identifier or code shape is invalid.Request must change · JSON RESPONSE+

{
  "code": "invalid_security_request",
  "message": "The enrollment identifier or code shape is invalid."
}

INTEGRATION DECISIONinvalid_security_request

CALLER ACTION: Rebuild the request from the live OpenAPI operation and correct the rejected method, media type, header, parameter, or body field.
RETRY SAFETY: Do not retry the same invalid request. For one logical mutation, retain the same Idempotency-Key and byte-equivalent request. Never reuse that key for changed instructions.
STATE RECONCILIATION: Compare the submitted values with the documented constraints before another call. Refresh the relevant account, session, authenticator, client, key, or one-time transaction state; replace consumed or expired credentials instead of replaying them.
ESCALATE WHEN: Escalate when account or tenant binding, session revocation, authenticator state, key rotation, or one-time-token consumption cannot be reconciled securely.

401The bearer credential is invalid.Authentication required · JSON RESPONSE+

{
  "code": "invalid_credentials",
  "message": "The bearer credential is invalid."
}

INTEGRATION DECISIONinvalid_credentials

CALLER ACTION: Discard the rejected credential, complete the documented authentication or reassertion flow, and rebuild any request signature with fresh timestamps and nonces.
RETRY SAFETY: Retry only with a newly valid credential and fresh replay-protection values. For one logical mutation, retain the same Idempotency-Key and byte-equivalent request. Never reuse that key for changed instructions.
STATE RECONCILIATION: Assume the outcome is unknown only when the connection failed after transmission; otherwise authentication failed before domain work. Refresh the relevant account, session, authenticator, client, key, or one-time transaction state; replace consumed or expired credentials instead of replaying them.
ESCALATE WHEN: Escalate when account or tenant binding, session revocation, authenticator state, key rotation, or one-time-token consumption cannot be reconciled securely.

403The enrollment is expired, cross-session, already consumed, or the code is invalid.Authority or policy denied · JSON RESPONSE+

{
  "code": "step_up_required",
  "message": "The enrollment is expired, cross-session, already consumed, or the code is invalid."
}

INTEGRATION DECISIONstep_up_required

CALLER ACTION: Verify the exact scope, tenant or workspace membership, owner boundary, step-up purpose, feature policy, and resource eligibility. Never broaden authority automatically.
RETRY SAFETY: Do not retry until the missing authority or policy condition has been deliberately resolved with least privilege.
STATE RECONCILIATION: Confirm the caller and resource resolve to the same authority boundary for accounts, activations, sessions, authenticators, step-up grants, workload identities, keys, and revocations.
ESCALATE WHEN: Escalate when account or tenant binding, session revocation, authenticator state, key rotation, or one-time-token consumption cannot be reconciled securely.

503Identity or authenticator encryption is unavailable.Dependency unavailable or outcome uncertain · JSON RESPONSE+

{
  "code": "identity_security_unavailable",
  "message": "Identity or authenticator encryption is unavailable."
}

INTEGRATION DECISIONidentity_security_unavailable

CALLER ACTION: Preserve the exact request and treat the outcome as uncertain until authoritative state proves whether it committed.
RETRY SAFETY: Reconcile before retrying. For one logical mutation, retain the same Idempotency-Key and byte-equivalent request. Never reuse that key for changed instructions. Use bounded backoff with jitter.
STATE RECONCILIATION: Refresh the relevant account, session, authenticator, client, key, or one-time transaction state; replace consumed or expired credentials instead of replaying them.
ESCALATE WHEN: Escalate when account or tenant binding, session revocation, authenticator state, key rotation, or one-time-token consumption cannot be reconciled securely.

OPERATIONAL NOTES

Security and lifecycle guarantees

Present and store the ten recovery codes immediately; there is no recovery-code read endpoint.
Begin a new enrollment after expiry or an ambiguous consumed result rather than reusing the secret.

UPGRADING FROM V1

Legacy calls replaced by this operation

If you maintain an older integration, use this map to find the V2 replacement. Do not translate the old request field-for-field: rebuild it from the V2 parameters and schemas above because identity, authorization, replay protection, and response semantics may have changed.

POST/api/v1/auth/submitfirst2facodeAUTH: Submit first 2FA Code

DOCUMENTATION STATUS

This route is implemented in canonical gateway source and appears in the production OpenAPI snapshot observed 2026-09-11T06:35:11.572Z. Authentication, tenant, feature, venue, and market policy still apply.

Verify the exact production OpenAPI operation ↗Return to the V2 directory ↗